Ä Area: Metaphysics/UFOs and correlation ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ Msg#: 207 Date: 09-14-96 01:37 From: Don Allen Read: Yes Replied: No To: All Mark: Subj: 01:Traditional Metaphysic ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ M e t a p h y s i c a l R e v i e w Essays on the Foundations of Physics Metaphysics: The study of the fundamental or primary causes and the underlying nature of things ____________________________________________________________________________ Vol. 3 September 1, 1996 No. 3 ____________________________________________________________________________ ISSN 1083-1908 Table of Contents line number page number Articles: Traditional Metaphysics and the Boundaries of Science Howard P. Kainz ..................... 26 ................ 1 Information: New web-site, Volume 2 Cumulative Issue, Subscription and Paper Submission .......... 486 ............... 8 =========================================================================== Traditional Metaphysics and the Boundaries of Science _____________________________________________________ Howard P. Kainz Department of Philosophy Marquette University Milwaukee, WI 53233 kainzh@execpc.com (received: July 21, 1996) As is well-known metaphysics as originally propounded by Aristotle had a close connection with the natural sciences. This lasted through the middle ages, but recent centuries have witnessed the gradual splitting off of science from philosophy, then the largely unsuccessful attempts of various philosophical systems to attain validity and universal acceptance in relative or complete autonomy from the natural sciences, and more recently largely unsuccessful attempts to develop either autonomous metaphysical systems (e.g., twentieth-century Thomism) or autonomous replacements for metaphysics (e.g., phenomenology, analytic philosophy) or a metaphysics more explicitly related to contemporary developments in the natural sciences (e.g. the philosophies of Whitehead and Bergson). The last-mentioned attempt at coordinating metaphysics with science must inevitably encounter two major problems in the modern world: 1) Because of the "information explosion," ever-increasing specialization, and rapid developments in many natural sciences, it seems almost inconceivable that a metaphysics could be developed which would be coordinated with other sciences, except in a very superficial manner. 2) Metaphysics from time immemorial has been asking apparently unanswerable questions: e.g., what is the cause of the universe as a whole? What are the ultimate constituents of matter? If such questions haven't been satisfactorily answered after 2500 years of investigation, why continue to treat of them? With reference to problem #1, it should be observed that a holistic or synthesizing metaphysics which attempts to take into account results from other disciplines, is not necessarily doomed to superficiality, any more than the "general practitioner" in medicine or law must be necessarily superficial. Superficiality in such cases, and similarly for metaphysicians, can be avoided by avoiding incursion into areas lying outside of one's competence, and by appropriate consultation with specialists. In the specific case of the generalist in metaphysics, superficiality can be avoided by careful concentration only on areas of "interface" between metaphysics and the other disciplines. Some competence in these disciplines may, of course, be required for the metaphysician to understand and interpret the areas of interface. With reference to problem #2, it is important to note that some of the difficulty metaphysicians have had in answering "ultimate" questions, may be due to their tendency to ape science and mathematics in formulating their responses. It seems contrary even to common sense to expect that e.g. an ultimate question like "What is the cause of the universe?" might be answered ___ Psplit * 2.02 * Split/Post Processor! [Continued to 02/07] -!- FMail/386 1.02 ! Origin: A bad day at the beach beats a good day at work (1:3618/2)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) )))))))))))))) Ä Area: Metaphysics/UFOs and correlation ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ Msg#: 208 Date: 09-14-96 01:37 From: Don Allen Read: Yes Replied: No To: All Mark: Subj: 02:Traditional Metaphysic ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ in the form, "As a result of meticulous observations and careful calculations, we have discovered that the ultimate cause of the universe is X." A healthy suspicion should be triggered in us when we reflect that all the multifarious attempts in the history of metaphysics to adhere to ideals of mathematical, logical or scientific rigor have not resulted in one incontrovertible theory or solution. And the fact that metaphysical endeavors have historically led to unseemly and unwieldy paradoxes should make us doubly suspicious: But perhaps paradox is not threatening to, but rather positively beneficial to, and even integral to, the development of a viable metaphysics. Paradoxes cannot supply "answers" in the usual sense of the word, but they can supply insights in a paramount sense. Recent philosophical inquiries point to the conscious use of paradox as a definite possibility and a positive alternative to traditional "linear" modes of discourse, and the final parts of this paper will be devoted to fully investigating this possibility and its applicability to metaphysics. For the purpose of the present article, we will be including under the term, "science," "soft" sciences such as psychology, as well as the "hard" sciences like physics. In attempting to redefine and reestablish the relationship between metaphysics and the sciences, I will try to avoid two extremes: a) the notion that metaphysics is a kind of super-science whose mission it is to direct, and give "grounding" to, other disciplines; and b) the notion that metaphysics, having proven itself incompetent, should be replaced by the more humble, service-oriented, watchdog-type activities of merely assisting the scientists (who have all the important things to say about the world) to refine and clarify their words and expressions and their use of logic. From our rather middling position, then, I would point out how some of the most interesting metaphysical problems emerge from within science, e.g. the question about local causality as a paradigm, defended by Einstein, but apparently called into question by experiments related to Bell's theorem; and the pressing questions being raised by parapsychology about the notion of a bona fide "natural" phenomenon. From the side of metaphysics, it seems foolish to a) continue to deliberate in an "a priori" way questions e.g. about the ultimate constituents of material reality without consulting quantum physics; or about the existence and/or nature of consciousness without addressing the ongoing debate concerning the existence and nature of an "unconscious" or b) completely ignore such traditional philosophical questions because they are "the proper domain of science." The distinctive objective of this essay will be to show, then, how basic metaphysical problems emerge in contemporary disciplines and are actually formulated in those disciplines, and to work at a response without necessarily aping the notion of a "scientific solution." And if it so happens that attempts to answer specific questions lead to paradoxes, I will try to show how the paradoxes emerge, what are their grounds, and specifically what state of conflict or opposition they give expression to. I. METAPHYSICS AND THE HORIZONS OF PHYSICS __________________________________________ I. A. Macrocosmic Limits ________________________ According to Kant's "First Antinomy" in his _Critique of Pure Reason_ (A430, B458), human reason is involved in an incessant and inevitable vacillation with regard to the origin of the universe. On the one hand, it is impelled to posit some definite and absolute "first cause," in order to avoid the impossible task of imagining an actually infinite serial succession of causes. On the other hand, when we come to elaborate the context of any assumed "first cause," we are necessarily led into inconvenient assumptions of a "time" before time, and a "space" outside of space. Thus we are forced into the antithesis of declaring the world spatially and temporally infinite -- and the "vicious circle" begins all over again. It is easier to apply Kant's First Antinomy to ancient (e.g. Aristotelian) cosmology and Newtonian cosmology, than to contemporary cosmology, in which Einstein's General and Special Theories of Relativity prevail. When suitable qualifications are made, it becomes evident that the proponents of a "big-bang" theory are following roughly the pattern of "thesis" in the First Antinomy, i.e. those who want to obviate an infinite succession by positing a "singularity" which bears a striking resemblance to the idea of a first cause. The "steady state" theory as well as the numerous contemporary theories which involve the conceptions of an indefinite succession of emerging and dying universes may be taken as movements in the direction of the "antithesis" in the First Antinomy. The "big bang" theory is currently in the ascendancy, but questions may be raised about the nature of ___ Psplit * 2.02 * Split/Post Processor! [Continued to 03/07] -!- FMail/386 1.02 ! Origin: A bad day at the beach beats a good day at work (1:3618/2)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) )))))))))))))) Ä Area: Metaphysics/UFOs and correlation ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ Msg#: 209 Date: 09-14-96 01:37 From: Don Allen Read: Yes Replied: No To: All Mark: Subj: 03:Traditional Metaphysic ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ the "spontaneity" (or singularity) of the initial hypothesized explosion. "Spontaneity" sometimes is taken to be an acausal occurrence; but this seems to imply, by contrast, a preexisting causal context which is flouted by this particular occurrence (and this sort of context would be inconvenient for the initial singularity). "Spontaneity" also is taken to be a characteristic of organic, i.e. living entities. The idea of an organic universe has been proposed in Hindu cosmology, and intermittently in the history of Western cosmology. The "Gaia hypothesis," advocates methodologically construing terrestrial phenomena as organically interconnected. The "strong" version of the "anthropic principle" in cosmology holds that the universe as a whole may be teleologically organized to produce living beings; which raises the question: is organic life in some sense already implicit in the evolution of the universe. Insofar as an organic conception of the universe introduces the concept of self-causation, it may avoid the neat antitheses set up by Kant. If this idea is untenable, we are led to two final but possibly interrelated questions: 1) Is there any important sense of "spontaneity" not encompassed by the above two connotations, but applicable to the "Big Bang" theory? and 2) aside from organic cosmological theories, is there any viable "middle-ground" between the two options presented to us by Kant in the First Antinomy? I. B. Microcosmic Limits __________________________ According to the "thesis" of Kant's "Second Antinomy" in the _Critique of Pure Reason_ (A434, B462), an immediate and rational response to the existence of composite entities is to analyze them into certain simple atomic constituents that are not further divisible, even if we have no empirical evidence of such constituents. On the other hand, if we face up to the fact that even the smallest constituent, if it is spatially extended, would have to allow further divisibility ad infinitum into smaller but still extended parts -- we are led to posit the antithetical conclusion that everything is essentially composite. The atomic theory propounded by Dalton and his successors corresponded very well with the "thesis" of the 2nd antinomy until modifications by quantum theorists produced a certain ambivalence concerning the stability and distinguishability of atomic constituents. In particle physics the search for quarks seems to be the chief contemporary example of the continued pursuit of ultimate constituents capable of supplying relatively predictable building blocks for matter. But quarks are never found in isolation from other quarks; at the present stage of investigation, quarks could not be described as ultimate, indivisible building-blocks of matter. The mainstream in particle physics understandably gravitates in the direction of the "antithesis" of Kant's Second Antinomy -- towards webs of conversions and interactions among particles in which stability of position, identifiability, and indivisibility become relatively unimportant. It might be claimed that at least Leibniz among the classical modern thinkers escaped the Kantian antinomy by hypothesizing ultimate constituents called "monads," which were immaterial, simple units of perception/consciousness, not susceptible to extension and division. In like manner, the quantum physicists may claim a certain immunity to the Kantian critique, if they are dealing not primarily with "first-order" realities, i.e. the particles themselves, but largely with models and with statistical projections of probability related to a "second-order" reality, i.e. the wave-functions on graphs. In this sense, if a physicist, applying the Indeterminacy Principle, states that a particle cannot simultaneously have position and momentum -- this statement might apply primarily to the limits of his equations and the limitations of his measuring apparatus, rather than to some intrinsic property of particles. But this sort of separation of subjective factors -- instrumentation, methodology, etc. -- from objective reality runs counter to the claim of the Indeterminacy Principle that there can be no such separation. Pursued to its logical conclusion, the Indeterminacy Principle may indicate that the answer to Kant's Second Antinomy is also indeterminate -- that is, the physicist can fashion his/her procedures to deal either with a world of indivisible particles, or with a world of divisible particles -- the resultant "world" being largely the result of subjective determinations. II. METAPHYSICS AND THE HORIZONS OF PSYCHOLOGY _______________________________________________ II. A. The Unconscious ______________________ The notion of an "unconscious" did not emerge for the first time with Freud, but has been found in various formulations in both western and oriental philosophy over the past 2500 years. So an important first step will be to ___ Psplit * 2.02 * Split/Post Processor! [Continued to 04/07] -!- FMail/386 1.02 ! Origin: A bad day at the beach beats a good day at work (1:3618/2)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) )))))))))))))) Ä Area: Metaphysics/UFOs and correlation ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ Msg#: 210 Date: 09-14-96 01:38 From: Don Allen Read: Yes Replied: No To: All Mark: Subj: 04:Traditional Metaphysic ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ distinguish the current psychological connotation(s) of the concept from many of those other historical connotations, although in some cases a convergence of meaning will be found. Contemporary psychological theories of the unconscious have been developed primarily by "depth" psychologists or psychoanalysts, especially Freud and Jung, but interest in the notion of an "unconscious" is also to be found among psychologists of a more "behaviorist" orientation, e.g. Shervin. An initial, tentative classification of contemporary theories might also be based on the diverse possible combinations of the following alternatives: a) materialistically or organically based views, vs. views open to the existence of an immaterial or spiritual dimension; and b) emphasis on an individual unconscious, vs. emphasis on a collective unconscious. Some of the questions raised, explicitly or implicitly, by psychologists, have to do with verification: e.g. whether the best way to probe the unconscious is through hypnotism, dream analysis, free association, Rorschach tests, examination of mythology and folklore, stimulation of brain centers, testing of subliminal responses to stimuli, etc. These questions have an epistemological ring, but they are also patently metaphysical, since they explicitly or implicitly presuppose a preference for this or that conception of the ontological structure of the human psyche. Psychologists who accept the existence of an unconscious also raise important questions about the "location" of this unconscious, and the way that it could interact with or enter into, the contents of consciousness; about the precise structures of what is designated "consciousness"; and about the possible determination of human behavior through unconscious drives, attitudes, or archetypes. These latter questions bear some obvious similarities to traditional philosophical questions about the existence, origin and nature of a "mind" or "soul", and about the reality and scope of "free will." With regard to this latter point, it is perhaps significant that most existentialist, personalist and humanist psychologists, who are philosophically committed to fostering personal freedom, are rather uninterested in, or even opposed to, the supposition of an unconscious. Jean-Paul Sartre in his _Being and Nothingness_ (Part Four, 2, I; see also Part I, 1, I) includes an exposition of "existential psychoanalysis" which bears some similarity to the Freudian version of psychoanalysis, but is also sharply divergent from certain Freudian presuppositions, especially the hypothesis of an unconscious. Sartre objects to the supposition of an unconscious, insofar as it is not only a pseudo-scientific-repository of causal mechanisms, but also is conceptually self-contradictory (one would have to be in some way conscious of the "unconscious" in order to deal with it and achieve a Freudian breakthrough). For the unconscious Sartre substitutes the "prereflective" consciousness, which is later replaced by "the lived" (le vecu); and his own existential psychoanalysis concentrates on the inculcation of an awareness of one's own powers of self-determination rather than on one's determination by "unconscious" drives or residues built up from the past. The issue concerning the existence and nature of an unconscious is also relevant to other questions raised by philosophers: Questions about morality and conscience may not be unrelated to the existence of a super-ego, questions about concepts of God and religion may well be elucidated through the Jungian theory of supernal collective Archetypes, and questions about free choice should perhaps take into consideration Freud's theory of the instinctive drives of the Id, and the less well-known theory of temperament (according to the three dimensions of id, ego, and super-ego) also developed by Freud. Certain "epistemological" issues in philosophy would also seem to require examination in the light of depth psychology: Are our ideas just representations of external reality? (In order to answer this in the affirmative, we have to effectively rule out the possibility that these ideas are determined by inner needs, desires, drives or archetypes). What is the most certain and indubitable basis for experience? (In order to establish this we would have to rule out the possibility of unconscious motivation, Projection mechanisms," and delusions). Is there any privileged area of "mind" (independent not only from the body but from individual psycho-physical and collective archetypal determinism)? And how are we to interpret the borderline experiences of dreams, for which philosophers since Aristotle have produced tantalizing but still unsatisfactory explanations? We must also consider the objections brought by opposing schools of psychology against the depth psychologists and their sympathizers, in order to make eventually an enlightened choice among the competing schools of psychologists. In particular, we must consider the peculiar nature of "phenomena" investigated by the depth psychologist, and the special problems of verification inherent in their discipline. For the depth psychologist is not concerned with external responses, word associations, etc. (which are only "symptoms" of underlying syndromes), but more properly with internal mechanisms, drives, barriers, projections, etc. - "phenomena" which presumably no surgeon's knife could ever hope to isolate or make observable. The fact ___ Psplit * 2.02 * Split/Post Processor! [Continued to 05/07] -!- FMail/386 1.02 ! Origin: A bad day at the beach beats a good day at work (1:3618/2)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) )))))))))))))) Ä Area: Metaphysics/UFOs and correlation ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ Msg#: 211 Date: 09-14-96 01:38 From: Don Allen Read: Yes Replied: No To: All Mark: Subj: 05:Traditional Metaphysic ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ that particle physics has been able to overcome somewhat similar obstacles with reference to unobservable submicroscopic phenomena, perhaps offers a pertinent precedent and a meaningful analogy. But explicit and specific justification has to be given to the expansions of the concepts of "phenomena" and "evidence" involved in depth psychology. II.B. The Paranormal ____________________ David Hume in his Enquiry on Human Understanding (X, Part II, 93-94) sums up the basic Enlightenment opposition to belief in preternatural and paranormal, as well as supernatural, phenomena: we can only grant credence to phenomena which are demonstrated to be in accordance with the laws of nature; publicly acceptable "proof" of an exception to these laws would be self-contradictory. Later commentators on Hume have brought out a latent ambiguity in Hume's reference to "nature": if "nature" means "the cosmos as a whole" which could presumably include supernatural beings, his arguments would be weakened; but if "human nature" is focused on, the arguments would have greater force. With specific reference to ESP and psychokinesis, C. D. Broad's widely utilized "Basic Limiting Principles" (causes must come before effects, minds can't have direct influence on matter, knowledge must have some basis in sensations, etc.) have given further definition and specification to Hume's position, although some ambiguity between human "nature" and "nature" in a broader sense can still be detected in Broad's version. The very existence of a "science" of parapsychology is paradoxical: Parapsychology falls heir to verification problems even more acute than those (mentioned above) encountered by depth psychology, because the internal "phenomena" of principal interest here are not just invisible, but presumably go against the laws of nature as usually understood in psychology (according to which only present objects, not hidden objects, can cause perceptions; commands of the mind cannot cause external movements distant from a person; future events cannot have an effect on our present perceptions and knowledge; and so forth). In addition, the psychic phenomena at issue are, by definition, anomalous (not found, or not activated, in the ordinary psyche). So we end up discussing the possibility of preternatural events found in a select group of subjects. Precedents and analogies for this kind of verification problem are to be found in quantum mechanics -- for example, the unexplainable and unpredictable spin of photons in tests related to Bell's theorem. But in a way the problems are more acute in parapsychology. For unless the theoretical apparatus (including metaphysical constructs involving causality, temporality, nature, normality, and mind) are reexamined and found applicable to parapsychology, a conscientious and consistent scientist, even when witnessing paranormal phenomena, might be unable to recognize and accept them, but would ascribe them to deceit on the part of the subjects being tested or on the part of the parapsychologist purportedly presenting the evidence to scientific colleagues. Parapsychologists in university laboratories in the U. S. have concentrated in the latter half of the twentieth century on establishing as a fact the existence of paranormal phenomena. They have pursued this goal with a combination of controlled laboratory observations and statistical calculations in line with the laws of probability. The results have sometimes been impressive - e.g. probable demonstrations of clairvoyance or precognition which, with particularly "gifted" subjects, produced significant statistical evidence of "Psi" (psychokinesis, or the various forms of ESP) in reduplicatible experiments over a long period of time. However, they are trying to establish the validity of something which is supposedly in conflict with the laws of nature; the more successful they are, the more likely they are to be accused of contradicting basic "givens" of science, and thus of being unscientific themselves. One way out of this impasse may be in an application of Thomas Kuhn's theory of the evolution of scientific paradigms. In other words, we revise what we take as "givens" in science -- we revise "normal" laws. Another way may be an acceptance of the Yogic hypothesis that "Psi" is a normal power which can be brought out by special techniques in the same way that talents may be brought out by processes of education -- in which case "psi" would have to be reclassified as normal and natural. Even if the evidence for the existence of Psi turns out to be conclusive and convincing, a whole host of metaphysical problems will remain, most of them centering on the basic models we have for the structure of the human psyche. For example, neither the usual reductive materialist model nor the usual dualist model of the psyche in Western philosophy could give a satisfactory account for telepathy. The reductive-materialist model, which says that the "mind" is reducible to something material, e.g. chains of neural discharges, would need some kind of physical explanation for transmission of a psychic message, e.g. microwaves. The dualist model, which presupposes that ideas are transmitted from the mind of A through A's body or speech and through some physical medium to B's five senses and ultimately to B's mind -- is even more complex and unwieldy in the explanation of telepathy. Similar ___ Psplit * 2.02 * Split/Post Processor! [Continued to 06/07] -!- FMail/386 1.02 ! Origin: A bad day at the beach beats a good day at work (1:3618/2)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) )))))))))))))) Ä Area: Metaphysics/UFOs and correlation ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ Msg#: 212 Date: 09-14-96 01:38 From: Don Allen Read: Yes Replied: No To: All Mark: Subj: 06:Traditional Metaphysic ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ problems result, as will be shown, with regard to the interpretation of clairvoyance, precognition and psychokinesis, in terms of current models of the psyche. And thus the major challenge for philosophy lies in devising a model of psychic structures which could accommodate the "paranormal" as well as the normal functions of consciousness. Inability to construct such a model may be viewed either as a counter-indication to the possibility of Psi as currently interpreted, or as an explanation for the considerable continuing resistance of scientists to acceptance of evidence for Psi. III. PARADOX AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOLOGY ________________________________________ I would like to draw attention to one final "boundary" of a rather unique sort, namely, the boundaries of language and thought. "Philology" in the contemporary world is an umbrella term, which sometimes includes more, sometimes fewer, disciplines. I am using "philology" here in a wide sense, as including all disciplines or branches of disciplines which have to do specifically with words and the uses of words and word-formations, or the proper correspondence between words and concepts. Thus I am including here the work of logicians, concerned with the proper methods of inferences from terms and propositions to conclusions; of literary critics concerned with the artful and elaborate diction of fiction and poetry; of theologians concerned with the specific ways salvific truths are presented in canonical scriptures; and of philosophers concerned with developing more adequate means for expressing ultimate and metaphysical conceptual truths. A consensus seems to emerge from all these sources that paradox is the result of pushing language and/or thought to or beyond its limits; so that paradox is a kind of natural "boundary" for systems of language and associated systems of thought. Among logicians, who have hoped for thousands of years to develop a highly flexible yet rigidly consistent system of logic, the existence of paradoxes has always been a frustrating reminder of lacunae in their systems, as well as an instigation to renewed attempts to produce more complete systems in which the so-called "logical" paradoxes will no longer pose even specious threats to the integrity of logical thinking. Some literary critics in recent decades have been much more positive about the existence of paradoxes. Exponents of the so-called "New Criticism," for example, have even pointed to paradox (implicit or explicit) as essential to the literary quality of poetry. For such critics paradox becomes not just an embarrassing limit, but a boundary in the most positive sense, i.e. the culmination of the finest things that a language and its literature can accomplish. Some Christian theologians in the twentieth century have pointed to the paradoxes of the Gospel as the ultimate religious truth and the ultimate expressions of religious language; and their observations could easily be extended beyond Christianity to the religious insights of Buddhism, Hinduism, and especially Taoism. Finally, some philosophers, noticing that philosophical concepts, when fully elaborated, tend to merge with their opposites, have begun to recognize paradoxical thinking as necessary and productive. For example, G.W.F. Hegel in a chapter on "Understanding" in his _Phenomenology of Spirit_ argues that progress in understanding eventually leads to certain limits, beyond which an "inverted world" begins to appear, i.e. a world where opposites are unified and paradoxes become rife. He attributes such an emergence to the heightened development of human self-consciousness. More recently, the French phenomenologist Jacques Derrida, focusing on the limits of language, points out that there are contradictory or paradoxical shades of meaning in language itself, which can be disclosed through a process of systematic "deconstruction." By an extensive examination of both the negative and positive philological assessments of paradox, philosophers may be able to come to a better understanding of the "strange loops of the mind" which give rise to paradox. And it is worth noting that paradoxes are endemic in the major issues we have discussed above: e.g. (I.A) the old (Kantian) paradox that a "First Cause" outside the universe could not strictly be a cause at all -- this is paradoxical as applied to current cosmology, leading, as I mentioned, even to a consideration of the possibility of an ultimate cause for the universe within the universe itself; (I.B) the traditional paradox that an ultimate particle would have to be unextended and massless, and hence not a particle at all, and the relatively new paradox that the ultimate "particles" of quantum mechanics seem to be waves, or even, in the estimation of some of the more speculatively inclined physicists, seamless garments of interwoven events; (II.A) the psychological paradox that we seem to be impelled to become conscious of the unconscious, but if we completely understood unconscious events, they would no longer be unconscious; (II.B) the parapsychological paradox that paranormal phenomena would have to follow the normal laws of nature in order to be fully understood and elucidated, but if they were fully understood they would no longer be paranormal; and lastly, (III) the philological paradox that paradox itself, in literature, religion, and philosophy, may be the clearest and even simplest way to express concepts ___ Psplit * 2.02 * Split/Post Processor! [Continued to 07/07] -!- FMail/386 1.02 ! Origin: A bad day at the beach beats a good day at work (1:3618/2)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) )))))))))))))) Ä Area: Metaphysics/UFOs and correlation ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ Msg#: 213 Date: 09-14-96 01:38 From: Don Allen Read: Yes Replied: No To: All Mark: Subj: 07:Traditional Metaphysic ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ which would lose their force or even their validity if expressed in more normal speech modes. ==================================================================== New Web-Site ____________ Metaphysical Review now has its own web site. The URL is: http://www.meta.unh.edu/ The old web-site will be maintained for a few months, but please change any pointers you might have to the new site. Volume 2 - Cumulative Issue ___________________________ The Volume 2 (July 1995 - June 1996) Cumulative Issue is now available. It contains all the essays, comments and letters of the last year. It can be obtained from the web-site, or you can request it by e-mail from me. It is big. Plain Text - 86-pages (433 kbytes) REVTeX - 62-pages (317 kbytes) .dvi - 62-pages (431 kbytes) PostScript - 63-pages (1,746 kbytes) - includes photos Subscription and Paper Submission: __________________________________ The general address of this journal is: metaphysical.review@unh.edu Subscription is free. Please feel free to forward a copy of this issue to anyone. If you are a regular reader please subscribe so we have an idea of how widely the journal is read. To subscribe please include: your e-mail address your name your institution (optional) preferred format (plain-text, revTeX, .dvi, PostScript - default: plain-text) This is an informal journal and we encourage all levels of contributions. We will publish essays/papers, book reviews, comments or letters. We ask that all contributing manuscripts be in plain text, readable on the screen of a VT100 (ie. something all readers have access to). Manuscripts should be sent to the above address. Include: your name your e-mail address Metaphysical Review presently has a very small circulation, and even a smaller list of contributors. It is presently experimental. To evolve and be successful it needs readers and writers. All comments are welcome. Timothy Paul Smith - editor Durham, New Hampshire September 1, 1996 =================================================================== copyright 1996 Metaphysical Review Metaphysical Review is produced by its editor - Timothy Paul Smith The authors and original publishers of the articles, letters and comments retain all the rights and ownership of their contributions. ___ Psplit * 2.02 * Split/Post Processor! [End 01 through 07] -!- FMail/386 1.02 ! 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